A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, where the emphasis is on the interaction between the preemptive and defensive measures taken by two targeted countries facing a common threat. The preemptor is likely to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors -cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks, and domestic terrorism losses -that determine counterterrorism allocations. The study shows that the market failures associated with preemptive and defensive countermeasures may be jointly ameliorated by a disadvantaged defender. Nevertheless, the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be suboptimal owing to a preemption choice that does not fully internalize the externalities.
crucial security concern worldwide. The enhanced movement of people, resources, and goods tied to globalization provides terrorists and their weapons with greater cover.
The primary purpose of this article is to investigate the interplay between preemptive and defensive countermeasures against terrorism when two countries are threatened by the same terrorist group. Targeted countries' defensive decisions depend on the level of the terrorist threat, which, in turn, is influenced by earlier preemptive actions. Moreover, a nation's preemptive decision is conditioned on how well its subsequent defensive measures protect against terrorist attacks. Given the common terrorist threat, each country's preemptive and defensive choices are also dependent on the choices in the other targeted country. Thus, strategic concerns involve not only the two types of counterterrorism policies, but also the decision makers. This strategic interplay is captured by presenting a two-stage game where each of the two at-risk countries decides preemption in the first stage and defensive responses in the second stage. In each stage, the country chooses its best response in relation to that of the other country.
We initially model the preemptive choice as preceding the defensive action because a preemptive decision may reduce or eliminate the terrorist threat by decreasing terrorist resources, thereby lessening the need for defense. Most defensive decisions do not greatly reduce the need for preemption, especially if the terrorists are determined to attack no matter how well targets are fortified. Today's fundamentalist terrorists display such determination. In Section V, we, however, show that reversing the stages -defense before preemption -does not qualitatively alter our main findings, so that the staging assumption is not driving the results.
Most of the literature examine preemptive or defensive counterterrorism measures as isolated decisions. 1 Only Arce and Sandler (2005) , Sandler and Arce (2007) , Trajtenberg (2006) , and Poveda and Tauman (2007) allow for both preemption and defense in the same model.
However, Arce-Sandler's single-stage analyses do not permit any real interaction between the classes of counterterrorism policies, because, unlike the current study, neither policy choice includes parameters (e.g., cost comparisons) from the other type of policy. In Trajtenberg's (2006) two-stage model, a central government eliminates any strategic interaction at the preemption stage. Unlike Poveda and Tauman's (2007) two-stage model, our analysis brings out the importance of the inter-stage cost differences in a comparative advantage viewpoint.
Moreover, we are the first to include foreign interests and terrorist targeting bias when at-risk countries decide preemptive and defensive measures. Our investigation shows that a high-cost defender is apt to provide a preemption free ride for the low-cost defender. This outcome may hold even when the high-cost defender is also the high-cost preemptor. When preemption is studied in isolation, the preemptor will be the nation with the lowest marginal preemption cost.
Our interplay representation shows that the market failures associated with preemptive and defensive actions are mutually interdependent. Underprovision of preemption in stage 1 may exacerbate the excessive defense in stage 2 by making for an even more insecure environment.
I. MODEL PRELIMINARIES
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence or force by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. Terrorists heighten public anxiety by making their attacks appear to be random so that everybody feels at risk. In fact, these attacks are not random and are purposely directed at "soft" targets that institute fewer precautions (Enders and Sandler 1993) . This anxiety is also augmented when terrorists attack a country's assets -its people or property -at home and abroad, so that there appears to be no sanctuary. In the latter scenario, terrorism assumes a transnational form that is prevalent today and captured by our model.
We assume two nations -home (H) and foreign (F) -are the potential targets of a terrorist group. In this two-country world, the level and, thus, damage from terrorism is captured by T, which can be reduced in stage 1 by preemptive measures (m) by either country:
(1) (1) indicates that preemption decreases damages at a diminishing rate. Preemption is a pure public good abiding by a summation technology -i.e., preemption by either country is a perfect substitute against the common threat of terrorism. As a public good, preemption implies strong free-rider incentives.
Stage-1 preemption can reduce the terrorism threat by lowering T, but defensive measures are then needed in stage 2 as targeted countries take actions to deflect terrorist attacks.
Defensive measures protect the defender but do not reduce terrorists' assets (but see Section V(c)). In stage 2, targeted countries thus face a constant terrorist threat T, determined by stage-1 preemptive measures. The defensive stage exhibits a rivalry or transference property: a rise in the level of, say, H's defense will reduce its terrorism while this defense increases attacks in country F. This scenario is appropriate for today's loose global network of fundamentalist terrorists, who will identify and attack the most opportunistic target. As targeted nations choose their homeland security independently, there is a strong tendency to overdefend, analogous to overexploitation in a commons. This tendency may be limited somewhat when a country has people or property in the other country. This follows because deflected attacks still put a country in jeopardy, but typically by less than a home attack.
When two or more countries are at risk, the decision maker in each country independently decides counterterrorism measures. 2 We treat each country as having a unitary decision maker for the two choices. To capture the sequential decision-making process, we find the subgame perfect equilibrium for the two countries.
II. STAGE 2: THE DEFENSE GAME 
The α parameter allows the terrorists to have a bias (preference) to attack H. If, for example, alQaida is biased to attacking the United States over the United Kingdom (i.e., 0 α ≠ ), then equal defensive efforts in the two nations will result in the United States facing p > 50%. The likelihood of attack in F is 1 − p, given our two-country assumption.
The probability function has the following first-order and second-order partials: Using (8) and (11) and noting that p 11 is positive, we have: Using (10) and (11) and noting that 22 0, p < we can similarly express the slope of country F's reaction path as:
A comparison of the reaction path slopes in (12) and (13) reveals that these reaction paths are sloped in opposite directions unless the effective costs of the two nations are equal. In this latter case, we have symmetric reaction paths with zero slopes at the second-stage Nash equilibrium.
7
Employing (6) and the analogous first-order condition for F, and substituting for p 1 [from (3)],
we can express the reaction functions of H and F as:
Relations (14) and (15) [ Figure 1 here]
We can simultaneously solve the second-stage Nash reaction function in (14) and (15) Given that overall threat decreases with preemption (i.e., 0 T ′ < ), the equations in (16) indicate that heightened preemption will reduce both countries' defensive measures. By abstracting from stage-2 deflection effects, we see that greater preemption reduces T, which, in turn, lowers the marginal benefit of H from defensive actions [i.e., [ Figure 2 here] An increase in preemption moves stage-2 defense closer to the Pareto-optimal zero defense levels, found by choosing 
.
In (17), added defense is costly without reducing terrorism damage. Cooperative defense levels are zero because the only role that defense has in our context until Section V is to transfer attacks abroad. This transfer motive disappears under joint maximization. By shifting N toward the origin in Figure 2 , enhanced preemption in stage 1 ameliorates the overdefense market failure of stage 2.
III. STAGE 1: THE PREEMPTION GAME
We now turn to the preemption decision in stage 1, conditioned on the Nash equilibrium values in (16) for the defensive choice in stage 2. Preemption is a pure public good, because any action to weaken the common terrorist threat curtails the terrorism risk for both targeted countries. On the basis of our analysis, the US "war on terror" beginning on October 7, 2001 is expected to provide benefits to all targeted nations. As a public good, preemption is anticipated to be undersupplied. Moreover, corner solutions are likely where one set of nations take proactive measures (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) and the other set does nothing. Few nations took active steps to track down al-Qaida operatives or to destroy their infrastructure (e.g., training camps) following 9/11. To capture this scenario in our two-country model, we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium has a preemptor and a free rider. Our basic findings, however, do not change when we later relax the constant marginal preemption cost assumption and have both countries taking proactive measures.
The loss function of country H in stage 1 is: 
In (20) 
where we substituted 
which is independent of m, so that 0. dp dm = This insight helps to establish that the second- 
The associated Kuhn-Tucker condition can be written as:
where we account for 2 0, 
1 .
Based on a series of substitutions involving stage-2 equilibrium values for a H and a F , inequality (25) can be written as: (27) is positive. The right-hand side of (27) is, however, negative owing to H's high-cost defender status. Thus, equation (27) is satisfied so that H's net marginal gains from preemption exceeds those of F; hence, H preempts and F free rides. This is illustrated in Figure   3 where line AA denotes 
Case 1C: H has higher preemption and defensive costs
This case is less clear-cut because preemption inefficiency works against H becoming the preemptor while defensive inefficiency works in favor of H becoming the preemptor. As before, H will preempt provided that its net marginal preemption benefits exceed those of F. Based on (26) and the benchmark assumptions, H will preempt if the following inequality is satisfied: is greater than the latter, then H preempts despite its inefficiency. This is displayed in Figure 4 where the wide separation between MB H and MB F and the small difference between and H F m m c c fulfills (29). If, however, the separation between the marginal benefit curves is smaller and/or the separation between the marginal preemption cost lines is greater, then F will be the preemptor.
[ Figure 4 here]
(b) Discussion of case 1
The essential message is that the preemption decision critically depends on the relative cost advantages (or disadvantages) between countries H and F for both counterterrorism activities, associated with the two stages of the game. Proposition 1 follows from the analysis thus far:
Proposition 1: With constant marginal preemption costs, 1
preemption preceding defensive measures, the high-cost defender will afford the other targeted country a preemption free ride whenever the disadvantaged defender is not the high-cost preemptor. If, however, a country is relatively disadvantaged at preemption and defense, then it may still preempt when it is relatively more inefficient at defense.
The latter part agrees with the notion of comparative advantage that determines trade patterns in a Ricardian model. That is, a country may export a good for which it is absolutely disadvantaged (i.e., its costs are higher than the trading partner), provided that its disadvantage in the export good is small compared to that in the import good.
The United States with its long northern and southern borders and long coastline is a high-cost defender against terrorists. US isolated geographical position does not afford protection against terrorists, who can slip through lengthy hard-to-guard borders. As such, it must assume a preemptor role and has done so, especially since 9/11. As the United States continues to apply new technologies (e.g., unmanned drones in Afghanistan) to augment its preemption efficiency, these efforts will cement the US position as the key preemptor against terrorism.
(c) Case 2: Foreign interests and terrorists' bias
To simplify the analysis, we first assume that both countries have the same valuation parameters for domestic damages ( (26) becomes: is obvious that the right-hand side of the inequality must fall as δ rises. Appendix C shows that preemption must rise when the nation providing it has greater foreign interests. Thus, m must rise with δ , reducing the absolute value of T ′ [note that Figures 3-4 .
The analysis implies:
Proposition 2: For the base model, foreign interests can induce even a low-cost defender to engage in preemption owing to losses abroad that cannot be limited through homeland security.
This tendency is stronger when the targeted country is not a high-cost preemptor. Prime-target nations are more apt to provide preemption, thereby curtailing the importance of cost comparisons.
As a prime-target nation and high-cost defender, the United States has little choice but to assume the preemptor role against global terrorism. In so doing, any country must exercise care that its preemptive measures are not excessive or brutal or else negative externalities from more grievances and terrorism, not modeled here, may result (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Sandler et al. 2009 ). 
Other interesting possibilities include

IV. FURTHER CASES
Our comparative-statics results explain the behavior of other high-cost defenders, whose marginal preemption costs are relatively low. The United Kingdom has significant foreign interests and a long hard-to-defend coastline, which makes it a high-cost defender. United
Kingdom's ability to project power abroad makes its marginal preemption costs relatively small compared with most countries. Hence, its active role as a preemptor of transnational terrorism after 9/11 agrees with our comparative statics. This is especially true when we consider the United Kingdom as a prime-target country, second to the United States. France is in a similar position and has engaged in preemption. Spain is also a high-cost defender with long borders and many entry points. Even though Spain is not a low-cost preemptor, it participated in the offensive on al-Qaida until the Madrid bombing and the change in government.
Our comparative statics indicate that low-cost defenders with high-cost preemption will not engage in preemption. Switzerland and Austria are low-cost defenders with relatively easyto-defend borders and few entry points, compared with Spain, the United Kingdom, and France.
The Alps limits defensive expense in Switzerland and Austria. Given their inability to project power to foreign lands harboring terrorists, Switzerland and Austria are high-cost preemptors.
Understandably, neither country joined efforts on the war on terrorism. Other small European countries -e.g., Croatia -are in the same position.
Another example involves Pakistan and India, where Lashkar-e-Taiba poses a terrorism risk for both countries. This group is based in Pakistan and has two aims: a pan-Islamic state in South Asia and an end to India's rule in Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Taiba has conducted terrorist attacks in both Pakistan and India, and is believed responsible for the November 2008 massacre in Mumbai, India. Even though India is the prime-target country and a high-cost defender given its myriad entry points, it has not taken preemptive actions in Pakistan. This is because the marginal preemption costs of violating Pakistani territory is extremely high (maybe infinite), since such actions may ignite a nuclear war. Surely, Pakistan has much smaller preemption costs and, thus, has taken some recent actions against the group to limit hostilities with India.
Pakistani actions will increase as breakaway elements from Lashkar-e-Taiba attack Pakistani interests.
V. MODEL ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we alter three key assumptions to demonstrate that the model is robust. To limit complications, we assume that the valuation parameters ( 
(a) Reversing the stages: defense before preemption
If the defense decision precedes preemption, then a nation may choose defense strategically to influence the equilibrium preemption level in stage 2, thereby affecting the level of terror. In particular, a nation may pick a high level of defense as a ploy to place the preemption burden on its counterpart. Although strategic motives change with this staging reversal, the thrust of our central findings does not change: relative defense cost and preemption cost comparisons determine the interaction between the defense and preemption choices. Moreover, a high-cost defender is apt to do the preempting.
With some algebra, we can establish
Since the left-hand side of (31) is positive, the equation is necessarily satisfied if
Equation (32) is a sufficient condition for H to preempt and for F to free ride in the reverse-order game. This relationship is more likely to hold when H is the relatively high-cost defender and/or the relatively low-cost preemptor. If, for example, the nations have identical marginal preemption costs so that the left-hand side of (32) is 1, then H is the preemptor if it is the highcost defender which mirrors (28). If, moreover, H is the low-cost preemptor and the high-cost defender, them it will preempt as was the case in Section III(a). Similarly, H will preempt even as a high-cost preemptor, provided that it is more disadvantaged as the defender. In short, Proposition 1 holds qualitatively regardless of the order of play. Allowing for foreign interests and terrorist targeting bias will have the same influence as captured in Proposition 2.
(b) Nonconstant marginal preemption costs and mutual preemption
We now return to the base model with preemption preceding defense, while assuming no foreign interests or terrorists' targeting bias. Our goal is to show that allowing for nonconstant marginal preemption costs and positive preemption levels for both countries do not qualitatively change our core results. To accomplish this task, we let the marginal preemption cost functions be . That is, the high-cost defender provides the same or more preemption as compared with the low-cost defender -a result that qualitatively agrees with the free-riding case ( )
The low-cost defender stands to get more spillover preemption benefits.
(c) Defensive actions and global terror reduction
We expand the basic model to allow defensive measures to reduce global terror so that the defensive stage is no longer a constant-sum contest. If hardening a target results in terrorists being captured and killed or their assets being seized during an attack, then defensive action can yield public security gains to bolster the defender's private deflection benefits. Any negative consequences to the attacking terrorists make all potential targets more secure -hence, the public characterization. Nevertheless, defender-specific gains are assumed to dominate since any terrorism reduction is fortuitous. That is, defensive measures cannot substitute for proactive operations that directly attack terrorists and their assets (e.g., bases and training camps).
The level of terrorism is now The stage-2 first-order conditions for defense are: Compared with earlier stage-2 first-order conditions for defense, there is an additional marginal benefit arising from the reduced terrorism (i.e., T 2 term). While this influence creates a private incentive to increase defense, there is also a public incentive to free ride on the actions of others.
This public benefit attenuates the tendency to oversupply defense. 
. Relation (36) is qualitatively similar to (27), so that the conclusions that follow from (27), including Proposition 1, hold with a nonconstant-sum contest where defensive measures can reduce terrorism.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This is the first paper to investigate the interaction between the mix of preemptive and defensive counterterrorism policies in a comparative advantage framework when countries confront the same transnational terrorist threat. The analysis identifies five key determinants: the countries' relative defensive costs, their relative preemption costs, their relative assets abroad, their relative damage assessment at home, and terrorists' attack preferences. Our two-stage game representation shows that, ceteris paribus, the high-cost defender will often provide preemption that benefits both targeted countries. In addition, the prime-target country is prone to preempt in order to reduce its subsequent defense spending. Lower preemption costs are not sufficient to determine the preemptor, because high defense costs and/or prime-target status can overcome the influence of comparatively low preemption costs. Countries with greater interests abroad have higher effective marginal defense costs, which bolsters their preemption efforts. Moreover, countries that place more value on terrorist damage at home will, ceteris paribus, preempt. In practice, prime-target countries with long borders, many entry points, and high levels of foreign direct investment are the likely preemptors, a prediction that fits the United States and the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that studying preemptive and defensive counterterrorist measures in isolation provides only a partial picture, because the interplay of the two decisions are ignored.
By relaxing key assumptions in Section V, we show that the order of play, variable preemption costs, and terrorism-reducing defensive measures do not qualitatively affect our results.
Our study also offers novel insights into the market failures associated with preemptive and defensive countermeasures. Countries that are least prone to oversupply defensive actionsthe high-cost defenders -are motivated to preempt a common threat owing to their defensive disadvantage, thereby lessening the undersupply of preemption. Preemption in stage 1 limits the overprovision of defense in stage 2. The corner solution that may characterize preemption in stage 1 means that the market failure associated with undersupplied preemption is not completely eliminated -one at-risk country is still free riding and the preemptor is not internalizing the benefits conferred on the other country. Nevertheless, there is some amelioration of the market failure owing to the interplay of the two stages. Even when both countries preempt, the preemption levels are still insufficient owing to incomplete internalization of external benefits.
Our analysis demonstrates that effective counterterrorism policy must assume a broader viewpoint that integrates defensive and preemptive choices. This requires much greater cooperation between the agency charged with homeland security and that charged with defense (Hoffman 2006, p. 16 
Upon cancellation and cross multiplication, we obtain: 10. Given that the cooperative defense levels are zero, the probability of attack between the two targets can differ only due to the bias parameter so that p is ( ). > in the cooperative equilibrium (whenever T ′ is sufficiently large as m tends to zero). This means that the nations will jointly assign preemption to the lower marginal preemption cost nation. Clearly, our noncooperative preemption outcome is distinct (and therefore not surplus maximizing), because unlike the first-best case, marginal defense costs also play a role in determining the pattern of provision.
11. H endogenizes (16) in its stage-1 decision making owing to backward induction.
12. This follows from (1), (16) 
